Abstract-Vote validity proof and verification is an efficiency bottleneck and privacy drawback in homomorphic e-voting. The existing vote validity proof technique is inefficient and only achieves honest-verifier zero knowledge. In this paper, an efficient proof and verification technique is proposed to guarantee vote validity in homomorphic e-voting. The new proof technique is mainly based on hash function operations that only need a very small number of costly public key cryptographic operations. It can handle untrusted verifiers and achieve stronger zero knowledge privacy. As a result, the efficiency and privacy of homomorphic e-voting applications will be significantly improved.
INTRODUCTION
E-voting is a popular application of cryptology to secure network services. It is well known that it can exploit homomorphism of the so-called additive homomorphic encryption algorithms to protect the privacy of the voters. An encryption algorithm with decryption function ( for any ciphertexts 1 c and 2 c . In secure evoting, sum of the votes encrypted with an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm can be recovered without revealing any single vote. Such e-voting schemes are called homomorphic evoting [1, 2, 5, 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [19] [20] [21] , which count the votes without decrypting their encryptions. In homomorphic e-voting, a voter has to include a voting choice for every candidate in his vote. If the voter wants to elect a candidate, he encrypts a "1" choice for him; otherwise he encrypts a "0" for the candidate. Then the votes are encrypted using an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm. The talliers exploit homomorphism of the encryption algorithm to find out sum of the votes for every candidate without decrypting any single vote. In homomorphic e-voting, each voting choice must be either 1 or 0 to guarantee correctness of the homomorphic tallying. So validity of the votes must be proved by the voters and then publicly verified. This proof and verification is highly inefficient in the existing homomorphic e-voting schemes [1, 2, 5, 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [19] [20] [21] . They usually employ ZK (zero knowledge) proof of partial knowledge [4] and need a cost linear in the number of candidates for every vote.
Recently, a couple of schemes [17, 18] are proposed to improve efficiency of homomorphic evoting. However, they are not general techniques suitable for most homomorphic e-voting applications. The homomorphic e-voting scheme in [17] can only handle a small number of voters. In most election applications, the number of voters overflows its upper limit and their votes must be grouped and tallying must be separately carried out in every group. The homomorphic e-voting schemes in [18] is only efficient when there is only one verifier to check validity of the votes 1 . So it is not suitable for publicly verifiable e-voting applications, where there are many verifiers including the talliers and other observers. As we study general efficient vote validity checking mechanism in this paper, the techniques in [17, 18] are incomparable to our work. Another drawback of the vote validity proof techniques in the existing homomorphic e-voting schemes including [1, 2, 5, 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [19] [20] [21] and [17, 18] is that they employ the so-called honest verifier ZK proof security model such that their privacy depends on a trust assumption that the verifiers in the proof are honest. So, in their interactive form they require that the verifiers randomly choose some challenges and in their non-interactive form (except for the vote validity proof protocol in [18] , which cannot be non-interactive) they depend on the random oracle model.
In this paper, an efficient vote validity proof mechanism including three proof protocols is proposed. It is mainly based on efficient hash function operations and symmetric cipher operations and only a small number of public key cryptographic operations are employed. So it is more efficient in both computation and communication than the existing vote validity proof techniques. Moreover, it upgrades honest verifier ZK to handle dishonest verifiers in the proof and can guarantee privacy even if the verifier is not trusted. Using our new proof technique, homomorphic e-voting can be not only more efficient to support users with limited computational capability and communicational bandwidth (e.g., mobile users) but also more private to support election applications with strong security requirements.
BACKGROUND
Technical background about homomorphic e-voting and security models for its vote validity proof are provided in this section.
Zero Knowledge Model in Privacy Analysis
Security of proof protocols are usually analysed using a formal method called ZK (zero knowledge) defined as follows.
Definition 1: (Zero Knowledge Proof) A zero knowledge proof can be formally denoted as 
passed its veri-fication with a non-negligible probability, it is guaranteed that the prover can calculate in polynomial time
Definition 4: (Privacy of zero knowledge proof) No information about the secret integers is revealed in the proof protocol. More precisely, there exists a polynomial algorithm without any access to the secret integers to generate a simulating proof transcript with the same distribution as the real proof transcript.
Privacy of ZK proof can be handled in different models. The simplest model assumes that the verifier is honest and does not try to extract any secret from the prover by deviating from the proof protocol. Zero knowledge in this model is called "honest-verifier zero knowledge." Although many proof protocols only achieve honest-verifier zero knowledge and are appreciated and employed in many applications, we still want to handle dishonest verifier and achieve stronger privacy in our proof technique. Although there are some costly techniques (e.g., [6] ) to upgrade honest-verifier zero knowledge to perfect zero knowledge, we prefer more efficient solution to achieve trust-free privacy and design a vote validity proof protocol to tolerate an untrusted verifier.
Homomorphic E-Voting
Homomorphic e-voting schemes [1, 2, 5, 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [19] [20] [21] employ an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm with a distributed decryption function to seal the votes. The tallying operation in homomorphic e-voting decrypts the sum of the votes instead of the separate votes. So it only costs one single decryption operation to count the votes for each candidate and is quite efficient. However, correctness of homomorphic voting depends on validity of the votes. An invalid vote can be the sum of multiple valid votes to compromise correctness of a homomorphic voting scheme. So, a vote validity check mechanism is necessary to detect and delete any invalid vote before the tallying phase.
A typical additive homomorphic encryption algorithm with a T-out-of-M distributed decryption function is distributed Paillier encryption proposed by Fouque et al [8] , which is recalled as follows.
Key generation:
where p and q are primes and 
. G is the cyclic subgroup containing all the quadratic residues in 
Encryption:
where r is randomly chosen from * N Z .
Partial decryptions of ciphertext c:
For j=1,2,…M, j A each private key share holder provides his part of decryption 
Combination of partial decryptions:
The final decryption result can be recovered as
where set Ψ contains the indices of T correct partial decryptions and
The complete decryption function in the distributed Paillier encryption, including the partial decryptions and the combination, is denoted as D( ). With this encryption algorithm to seal the votes, most of the existing homomorphic e-voting schemes can be abstracted into the following protocol.
1. Suppose there are n voters and w candidates and each voter has to elect some of the candidates in his vote. It is required that n<N, which is satisfied in any practical election. 
Each voter

Each voter i
V illustrates the validity of his vote through proof of
where KN(x) denotes knowledge of x . Proof of (1) Completeness and soundness of ZK proof of knowledge of the th N root [10] and ZK proof of partial knowledge [4] guarantee that with an overwhelmingly large probability a voter's vote is valid iff his proof of validity of his vote can pass public verification. Honest verifier ZK property of ZK proof of knowledge of root [10] and ZK proof of partial knowledge [4] guarantees that no vote is revealed in a vote validity check. Tallying is very efficient and only costs each tallier 3w exponentiations. Vote validity check is inefficient as it repeats the proof and verification protocol in Fig 1 for w times. The vote validity check brings each voter even higher a cost than vote encryption and a verifier at least O(wn) exponentiations. So vote validity check is the efficiency bottleneck of homomorphic e-voting.
EFFICIENT AND GENERAL VOTE VALIDITY PROOF
In this section, a new vote validity proof technique is designed. Firstly, it needs to slightly modify Paillier encryption algorithm to encrypt the votes in a special way. Then it reduces validity proof of a specially encrypted vote to proof of knowledge of multiple discrete logarithms, which is proved by a novel ZK proof without any trust assumption.
Adjusting Vote Encryption and Reducing Vote Validity Proof to Simple Zero Knowledge Proof
As explained in Section 2, the vote
is a vector containing one 1 and w-1 0s. In the following, we show how to reduce validity proof of such a vote to simple proofs, where vote encryption is slightly adjusted to support the reduction. 
Therefore, the probability that
In the second case, suppose only Z the probability that
is w/K and thus negligible.
Therefore, in both cases the probability that the message encrypted in i C lies in S is negligible.
Proof that 
where i R can be published. It is a proof of knowledge of 1-out-of-w discrete logarithms.Although ZK proof of partial knowledge [4] can implement it, the naive solution costs O(w) exponentiations in both proof and verification and is inefficient as explained in Section 2.
Efficient Proof with an Honest Verifier
The main idea of our efficient vote validity proof is proposed first in a prototype, which employs an honest verifier for simplicity of description. The talliers set up w different DiffieHellman keys, each of whose discrete logarithm is the product of two key roots. The two key roots for the . The proof protocol is described in Fig 2, which guarantees that the voter knows one of
This new vote validity proof protocol is called, "Protocol 1," in this paper. It is quite efficient. Especially the prover only needs a low constant computational independent of w in Protocol 1, which is thus suitable for low-capability voters who using mobile devices. Moreover, as L<<N, it greatly improves communicational efficiency as well. Completeness of Protocol 1 is straightforward and any interested reader can follow the proof protocol step by step to check it. Its soundness is proved in Theorem 2 under Diffie-Hellman assumption, as defined in Definition 5, while it is proved to be honest-verifier zero knowledge in Theorem 3. . So according to Diffie-Hellman assumption, the user must know
and r is kept secret from the prover. 
He sets u=m.
In both the real transcript of Protocol 1 with an honest verifier and the simulating transcript,
• z is uniformly distributed in the cyclic group generated from the generator As the two transcripts have just the same distribution, if the verifier is honest, a party without any knowledge of any secret and that does not deviate from the proof protocol can simulate the proof transcript of Protocol 1 without any difference. So Protocol 1 achieves honest-verifier zero knowledge.
Note that proof of zero knowledge of Protocol 1 in Theorem 3 assumes that the verifier is honest and does not deviate from the proof protocol. As explained in Section 2.1, it is very common and actually necessary in many proof protocols. However, when analysing privacy of a proof protocol, the assumption is not always unconditionally necessary and inherent. A verifier may be dishonest and deviate from a proof protocol in order to obtain some secret information from the prover. So if privacy of a proof protocol can only be proved when assuming that the verifier is honest, it should be explicitly called an honest-verifier zero knowledge proof protocol. Moreover, if the assumption can be removed in a proof protocol, it can achieve stronger and more formal privacy.
Efficient Vote Validity Proof with a Dishonest Verifier
A dishonest verifier in Protocol 1 can deviate from the protocol and try to extract some information about t as illustrated in Fig 3. Simply speaking, it commits to w different messages in respectively and can determine t according to the message returned by the user. Using this attack, no matter how t distributes in {1,2,…,w} a dishonest verifier can always extract t. A simple counteract to this attack is to slightly modify Protocol 1 into the proof protocol 
Efficient Vote Validity Proof with an Untrusted Verifier
When the verifier cannot be trusted and attacks by him to extract t must be prevented, the vote validity proof protocol can be optimised into Protocol 3 as described in As the employed hash functions are one-way and collision-resistent and it is difficult to find different integer pairs in two steps (instead of in one step) and there is a verification against the verifier before the second step, Protocol 3 actually employs the same proof principle as Protocol 1. So Protocol 3 inherits completeness and soundness of Protocol 1. Moreover, it optimises its zero knowledge property to achieve stronger privacy without any trust on the verifier. 
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
The new vote validity proof and verification protocols are compared with the traditional vote validity proof and verification technique in homomorphic e-voting through ZK proof of partial knowledge [4] in Table 1 . In comparison of privacy, the ZK models in different solutions are listed. In comparison of computational efficiency, computational cost of a voter and a verifier (tallier) in proving and verifying validity of the vote is estimated and exponentiations with fulllength exponents in N Z are counted. The proof protocols in Fig 2, Fig 4, . Those additional operations seem to cost 2w exponentiations with full length exponents if K is as large as N. Fortunately, as N is very large (e.g., hundreds of bits long) K can be much smaller than N while w/K is still negligible to guarantee the validity of the votes. For example, K can be set as w N 1/ in most election applications. When N is 1024 bits long and w=4, K is 256 bits long and is thus large enough. When N is 1024 bits long and w=16, K is 64 bits long and w/K is still negligible. With this optimised setting, cost of the additional operations is approximately equal to 2 exponentiations with full-length exponents in N Z and high efficiency is achieved for not only the prover but also for verifier. In comparison of communicational efficiency, the number of bits transferred between a prover (voter) and the verifier(s) is estimated. In a typical example where w=8, , efficiency advantage of our new methods in communication is significant as well.
The comparison clearly demonstrates that in comparison with the existing solution our new vote validity proof and verification technique is more efficient and stronger in privacy. 
